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Three experiments were conducted to investigate the hypothesis that young infants’ failures to 
search for occluded objects arises, not from deficiencies in their object representations, but 
from limitations in experience with the physical world. Successful means-end search is 
typically found at 8 months of age and is traditionally taken as the hallmark of object 
permanence. However, recent evidence suggests that infants much younger than 8 months of 
age are able to represent and reason about objects that are no longer visible. In Experiment 1, 
successful means-end search was found for 8.5-, but not 6.5-month-old infants in a traditional 
task, but younger infants showed successful search ability when the task was made familiar to 
them in Experiment 2 (i.e., when the toy and occluder are first presented as a single composite 
object), and when they were given the opportunity to watch a demonstration of the solution to 
the task in Experiment 3. These results are taken as evidence for the ‘experiential limitation’ 
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In the study of infant cognition, an important and unresolved issue concerns the fact that 
infants younger than 8 months of age typically fail to search for objects when hidden by an 
occluder. The ability to search for occluded objects has traditionally been taken as a hallmark 
of object permanence, a developmental landmark in infants’ ability to maintain a 
representation of an object when the object is not visually present. However, failures to search 
for occluded objects may not always be caused by deficient representations, and over the past 
50 years there has been little agreement about the possible reasons for such failures, and thus, 
over the validity of the claim that infants younger than 8 months of age do not possess an 
understanding of object permanence (e.g., Piaget, 1954). 
Jean Piaget (1954) was the first researcher to investigate this issue, and he believed that 
infants do not hold a complete understanding of object permanence until 18 to 24 months of 
age. In fact, Piaget suggested that a rudimentary understanding of object permanence only 
emerges at 8 to 9 months of age and that it is not until this age that infants understand the basic 
principle that objects continue to exist in the physical world even though they may not be 
visually present. Piaget based this conclusion on his quasi-experimental examination of how 
infants searched for hidden objects. In his tasks, a toy was hidden behind a screen (i.e., an 
occluder) and infants were given the opportunity to search for it. Using these ‘means-end’ 
search tasks, Piaget found that infants younger than 8 months of age made no attempt to grasp 
and remove the occluder (i.e., the means) to retrieve the toy (i.e., the desired end), or did so for 
reasons other than retrieving the toy, such as to play with the occluder. He concluded that 
infants younger than 8 months of age failed at this task because they were unable to represent 
the object once it was no longer visible. These classic observations of young infants’ 
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performance in means-end search tasks are robust, having been replicated numerous times over 
the years (e.g., Bower & Wishart, 1972; Diamond, 1993; Gratch & Landers, 1971; Uzgiris, 
1973; Willatts, 1984) and the conclusion that infants younger than 8 months of age do not 
understand object permanence is currently accepted by many researchers (e.g., Bogartz, 
Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997; Haith, 1998; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; Shinskey, Bogartz, & 
Poirier, 2000). 
Other contemporary researchers, however, have suggested that the traditional means-
end search task is too conservative as a measure of infants’ understanding of the continued 
existence of occluded objects (e.g., Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & 
Jacobson, 1992), primarily because such a measure is heavily dependent on infants’ motor 
abilities. Indeed, the results of recent research, utilizing methods that are not constrained by the 
motoric demands of a typical means-end search task, suggest that infants much younger than 8 
months of age are able to represent and reason about objects that are no longer visible (e.g., 
Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon & Graber, 1987; Baillargeon, 
Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Spelke, 1991; Wilcox, Nadel, & Rosser, 1996; Wynn, 1992, 
2000).  
Baillargeon (1987), for example, compared infants’ reactions to an expected versus an 
unexpected event to examine whether 4.5-month-old infants could represent an object that 
became temporarily hidden. In both events, a box was situated on the apparatus floor, and an 
occluder, originally lying flat at the base of the box, rotated backwards in the manner of a 
drawbridge, thereby occluding the box. In the expected event, the occluder stopped rotating 
when it reached the top of the box. In the unexpected event, the occluder rotated through a full 
180-degree arc until it rested on the floor of the apparatus, thus appearing to have “passed 
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through” the box. Baillargeon found that the infants looked at the unexpected event reliably 
longer than at the expected event. A control condition, in which the occluder rotated in the 
same manner as in the expected and unexpected events described above, with the exception 
that no box was present, produced equal looking times, suggesting that the infants did not 
simply prefer to look at the longer occluder-rotation. Baillargeon took these results as evidence 
that the infants were surprised when their expectation had been violated in the unexpected 
event (i.e., that the occluder did not stop rotating when it reached the box), and that this 
indicated that the 4.5-month-old infants must have represented the existence of the box when it 
was behind the occluder in order to generate this expectation.  
More recently, Aguiar and Baillargeon (1999) examined whether infants as young as 
2.5 months of age were able to determine whether an object should remain hidden, or become 
temporarily visible, as it passed behind different occluders. As in Baillargeon’s (1987) 
previous studies, infants viewed both an expected and an unexpected event. In the expected 
event, infants watched a toy mouse move across the floor of an apparatus and pass behind a 
occluder. The occluder had a central window extending down from its upper edge, but the toy 
mouse was shorter than the window’s lower edge and was thus never visible when it passed 
behind the occluder. The unexpected event was similar to the expected event, except that there 
were two separate occluders positioned a few inches apart from each other on the apparatus 
floor. In this event, the toy mouse moved and disappeared behind the first occluder and 
reappeared from behind the second occluder, but without appearing in the space between the 
occluders. Aguiar and Baillargeon (1999) found that 2.5-month-old infants looked significantly 
longer at this unexpected event than at the expected event, suggesting that the infants were 
surprised when the toy mouse did not appear in the gap between the two occluders. This 
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finding was therefore taken as evidence that the 2.5-month-old infants were able to represent 
the presence and trajectory of the toy mouse even when it was not visible. The ‘trick’ in the 
unexpected condition was that the experimenter was actually using two mice; one that initially 
moved behind the first occluder and another that moved out from behind the second occluder. 
Thus, the fact that there was no difference in infants’ looking times between the two conditions 
when the occluders were first lowered in a control condition to reveal two mice, one behind 
each of the two occluders (‘unexpected’ control) or one behind each edge of the single 
occluder (‘expected’ control), suggests that preferential looking in the unexpected condition 
did not occur when information to explain why the toy mouse passed behind the two occluders 
without appearing in the gap is readily available. The results of the control condition also 
provided converging evidence that the 2.5-month-old infants looked longer at the unexpected 
event, not because they had a preference for two separate occluders, but rather because they 
had expected the toy mouse to appear between the two occluders. 
Findings from experiments such as the rotating-occluder (Baillargeon, 1997) and the 
toy mouse experiments (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999) suggest that infants much younger than 8 
months of age are able to represent hidden objects. Such evidence underscores the need to 
understand why such infants fail to search for a hidden object in Piaget’s (1954) traditional 
means-end search task. The extant literature provides three prevailing explanations for such 
means-end search task failures: biological immaturity (e.g., Diamond, 1991), lack of 
understanding of causal relationships (e.g., Willatts, 1984), and limitations in representational 
quality (e.g., Munakata, et al., 1997). In contrast to these, the results of the research I report 
here suggest an alternative explanation that is based on infants’ experiential limitations. To 
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understand the rationale for the experiential limitation hypothesis, and the predictions that 
follow from it, it is useful to first consider the three prevailing explanations. 
Biological immaturity: Motor deficits 
 The motor skills that are necessary for successfully completing a means-end search task 
include the ability to reach for, grasp, and manipulate an object. Infants are able to reach and 
grasp for objects by 3 or 4 months of age (Spencer & Thelen, 2000). Several studies have 
shown that infants, well before 6 months of age, use visually guided reaches to grasp objects 
(e.g., von Hofsten, 1979; Robin, Berthier, & Clifton, 1996).  As a specific example, it has been 
shown that infants are able to adjust their reach by 4 months of age to contact moving objects 
(von Hofsten & Lindhagen, 1979). Furthermore, 5-month-old infants have been shown to 
successfully reach and contact stationary objects with and without the use of vision (i.e., in the 
dark; McCarty & Ashmead, 1999). 
  Infants are typically able to master fine finger movements, such as a pincer grasp used 
to pick up and manipulate tiny objects, by their first birthday. Precise manual behaviours such 
as these are present at 6 months and continue to be refined until 12 months of age (von 
Hofsten, 1993). However, even infants that are only 3-4 months of age are able to grasp and 
manipulate objects, they simply use less precise finger movements. Young infants tend to 
explore an object with one hand while holding on to the object with the other hand (Rochat, 
1989). Taken together, the existing evidence regarding motor development suggests that 
infants have the basic motor skills necessary for solving a means-end search task well before 8 
months of age.  
Although infants younger than 8 months of age may possess each of the basic motor 
skills necessary for solving a means-end search task, Diamond (1993) suggests that the 
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immaturity of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in infants younger than 7 months of age may prevent 
them from organizing their basic motor skills into effective sequences. According to Diamond, 
the apparent paradox created by infants’ failure at solving a means-end search task, but success 
at visual attention tasks, may be explained by the fact that reaching to remove an occluder to 
reveal a desired object is more complicated than the response needed in a visual attention task 
(i.e., where infants only need to look toward an object). According to this view, infants 
between 5 and 7 months of age understand the concept that an object continues to exist when 
hidden, but are unable to demonstrate this understanding in means-end search tasks because the 
lack of maturation of the supplementary motor area of the PFC yields imperfect sequencing of 
arm and hand movements.  Indeed, it has been shown that infants who are successful at an 
object retrieval task show an increase in Electroencephalogram (EEG) activity in the prefrontal 
cortex not observed among infants who are unsuccessful at the same task (Bell & Fox, 1997).  
Diamond and others argue that such dissociations between action and knowledge systems are 
produced by neurologically and psychologically distinct networks (Diamond, 1991, 1993, 
2000; Goodale & Milner, 1992).  Accordingly, knowledge systems may be fully functional, 
while action systems remain underdeveloped or impaired.  
Brain lesion studies involving both human adults and primates provide converging 
evidence for Diamond’s (1993) biological immaturity explanation, with lesions in the 
supplementary motor area producing difficulty in sequencing two motor skills needed to obtain 
a desired object, and causing errors in aiming reaches in monkeys and humans; individuals 
become “stuck” on the initial action in the behavioral sequence.  A monkey with PFC damage, 
for example, may attempt to reach around a barrier to obtain an object, and will continue to 
reach instead of halting their action at the barrier.  By continuing with the first action and 
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failing to switch to the second action, the animal ultimately reaches beyond the desired object.  
Diamond (1991) suggests that such behavior parallels that of 5- to 7-month-old infants 
attempting to solve manual search tasks.  Lack of maturity in the supplementary motor area of 
infants at this age may thus yield similar difficulty in sequencing motor skills needed in 
manual search tasks.  By 7 to 9 months of age, maturation of the PFC has progressed to the 
point of allowing for proper organization of movements so that infants are able to sequence the 
actions necessary to succeed at a manual search task.  
Means-end Reasoning 
Willatts (1984) proposes a similar explanation, with the addendum that infants younger 
than 8 months of age do not search for hidden objects and are unable to perform means-end 
action sequences because they are unable to reason about causal sequences.  In this regard, his 
argument that: “infants’ difficulty at producing a means-end sequence derives from their lack 
of knowledge of the appropriate actions for efficiently solving the problem” (p. 666, Willatts, 
1997) parallels Piaget. Indeed, some of Piaget’s observations support this view; for example, 
his report that young infants’ inability to retrieve objects was not limited to situations in which 
the object was hidden, but extended to other situations in which the desired object was in full 
view. Piaget found that infants younger than 8 months of age made no attempt to pull a cloth to 
bring a toy within reach when it was placed beyond reach on the far end of a cloth. Such 
failures by young infants’ in such tasks have thus been taken as evidence that infants younger 
than 8 months of age lack an understanding of causal relationships. Specifically, infants do not 
understand that a means-end action sequence, such as pulling the cloth (the means), would 
cause the toy to move within their reach (the end). Infants’ demonstrated ability to reach for 
objects concealed only by darkness appears to support this conclusion (Bower & Wishart, 
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1972; Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991; Hood & Willatts, 1986). Reaching for an 
object in the dark only requires a one-step direct reach, whereas reaching in a search task for an 
object occluded by a barrier, rather than darkness, requires a two-step means-end sequence 
(i.e., first reaching for and removing an occluder before reaching for the object). 
However, research using the violation-of-expectation paradigm suggests that infants 
much younger than 8 months of age are able to recognize appropriate means-end sequences.  
Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, and Black (1990), for example, demonstrated a means-end 
sequence to 5.5-month-old infants in both an expected and an unexpected visual event. In the 
expected event, the means-end action sequence that infants were shown was a sequence of 
events that were probable in the physical world. A toy bear was first placed on the left side of a 
cup. An occluder was then brought up which occluded the toy and cup. Finally, a hand reached 
behind the occluder from the right and retrieved the toy. The unexpected event was similar to 
the expected event, except that the infants were shown an impossible means-end sequence. In 
this event, the toy was placed under the cup, the occluder was brought up, and a hand reached 
directly behind the occluder and retrieved the toy, without first appearing to lift or remove the 
cup. The hand action in this event was identical to the hand action in the expected event, and 
yet the 5.5-month-old infants looked reliably longer at the unexpected event than the expected 
event. Baillargeon and colleagues took this finding as evidence that these infants were aware 
that a sole direct reach in the unexpected event was insufficient to retrieve the toy, suggesting 
that infants younger than 8 months of age are indeed able to recognize appropriate means-end 
sequences. These results suggest that infants do understand what action sequences are 
necessary for retrieving an occluded object. Why then are they not implementing this 
knowledge in order to search for hidden objects? 
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Representational Deficits 
 The theory that infants’ ability to successfully search for a hidden objects is related to 
the strength of the representation the infants holds for the object when it is no longer visible 
(e.g., Munakata, 1997) stands in contrast to that put forth by Diamond (1991). Diamond (1991) 
explains the seemingly contrary findings of young infants’ apparent memory for hidden objects 
in visual and manual search tasks not in terms of representational strength, but as being due to 
dissociations between action and thoughts. That is, young infants are able to hold hidden 
objects in memory, but the systems for acting on such representations are not yet developed 
before 8 months of age (Baillargeon, et al., 1990, Diamond, 1991; Bell & Fox, 1997).  
 In contrast, Munakata et al. (1997) has argued that young infants fail at manual search 
tasks because, once the object is no longer in view, infants’ representation of the hidden object 
weakens. According to this account, infants’ representation of the object loses its intensity over 
time and becomes degraded. Infants’ representations of hidden objects become stronger with 
maturation. Failure in manual search tasks is, by this account, due to weak representations of 
the hidden objects that would allow infants to recognize an unexpected event in a visual task, 
but would not suffice in directing the reach for the hidden objects. This graded representation 
account offers an explanation of findings that show young infants between 5 and 7 months of 
age are successful at searching for a toy hidden by darkness (Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger, 
1991). Such results have been explained as infants’ fragile representations of hidden objects 
can withstand the darkness of a room, but not the direct interference from an occluder in 




Experiential Limitation Hypothesis 
Given the evidence that infants are sensitive to hidden objects long before 8 months of 
age, it remains unclear why they have difficulty searching for objects hidden by occluders. 
Violation-of-expectation experiments, such as the rotating occluder (Baillargeon, 1987), the 
toy mouse experiment (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999), and the toy bear experiment (Baillargeon 
et al., 1990), indicate that infants younger than 8 months of age possess the conceptual 
knowledge necessary to solve means-end search tasks, that they are able to represent hidden 
objects, and are able to understand what action sequences are appropriate to solve means-end 
tasks. Despite this, infants at this young age fail at traditional search tasks. I address this issue 
in the present studies and propose that the discrepancy between the negative findings obtained 
by Piaget in the means-end search task and the positive findings found in the violation-of 
expectation experiments (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon et 
al., 1990), are due to infants’ experiential limitations. According to this experiential limitation 
hypothesis, young infants fail to search because such tasks require acting on one object as a 
means to achieve a goal involving another object, and young infants simply have little 
experience with such tasks. Because infants younger than 8 months of age are unfamiliar with 
problems involving acting on one object as a means to retrieve a second object, the solution to 
such problems does not spontaneously occur to them. The experiential limitation hypothesis 
differs from Piaget’s work in an important way; namely, that search behavior is an index of 
infants’ ability to use one object as a means of achieving a goal involving a second object, not 
just an index of infants’ understanding about the permanence of occluded objects (see also, 
Baillargeon, 1993). 
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The primary assumption of this hypothesis is that infants younger than 8 months have 
limited, if any, experience dealing with two objects. This assumption is supported by research 
described in the object manipulation and play literatures. For example, that infants have a 
tendency to explore only one object, manually or orally, until 7 to 8 months of age, and only 
after this age does activity with one object decrease to be replaced by activity in which two 
objects are manipulated simultaneously (e.g., Fenson, Kagan, Kearsley, & Zelzo, 1976; 
McCall, 1974). Even then, infants initially appear to put objects together in an unrelated 
manner (e.g., banging two random and unrelated toys), failing to combine objects in a related 
manner (e.g., putting a ball into a cup) until approximately 9 months of age (Belskey & Most, 
1981). Moreover, it is not until 7 or 8 months of age that infants become independently mobile 
and begin crawling or creeping. Such independence affords more opportunity for exploration 
of their physical world and corresponds to the age when infants are able to solve means-end 
search tasks. 
The experiential limitation hypothesis suggests that young infants faced with a means-
end search task are in the same position as children and adults who fail to solve a problem for 
which they possess the conceptual knowledge, but for which they have no previous experience 
solving. In this situation, children and adults often benefit if the novel problem is made 
familiar to them (e.g., Brown, Kane, & Long, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983), or if they are 
given a demonstration of the solution (e.g., Brown, 1990; Meltzoff, 1995). Indeed, the research 
reported here is an extension to search tasks of one previous set of studies conducted by 
Aguiar, Menard, Kolstad, and Baillargeon (2001) who demonstrated that 6.5-month-old infants 
may succeed in means-end support tasks (i.e., using a cloth to bring a toy, sitting on the far end 
of the cloth, within reach) if the task is first made familiar to them, or if they are first given a 
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demonstration of the solution. That is, young infants’ performance in such tasks is facilitated 
when they are able to overcome their experiential limitations. 
In Aguiar and her colleague’s (2001) first experiment, the means-end support tasks 
were videotaped. The experimenter drew the infant’s attention to a toy and a cloth, placed the 
cloth flat on the table, near end within the infant’s reach, and then placed the toy on the far end 
of the cloth. Infants were given a total of four such tasks and two independent coders 
categorized each infant’s behavior on each task as exhibiting either a means-end solution (i.e., 
the infant pulled the cloth as a means to obtain the toy) or a non-means-end solution (i.e., the 
infant clearly did not pull the cloth as a means to obtain the toy). It was found that the 8-, but 
not the 6.5-month-old infants, pulled the cloth as a means to attain the toy, thereby replicating 
Piaget’s (1952) original observations. The behavioral coding confirmed that the 8-month-old 
infants produced significantly more means-end solutions to the problem than the 6.5-month-old 
infants. Detailed frame-by-frame analyses of the test trials also revealed that those infants 
exhibiting means-end solutions were significantly faster at attaining the toy, spent significantly 
more time focused on the toy (as opposed to the cloth or the experimental room), and engaged 
in more behaviors relevant to retrieving the toy than infants exhibiting non-means-end 
solutions. 
In a second experiment, Aguiar and her colleagues (2001) examined whether 6.5-
month-old infants would reliably pull a cloth to bring a toy within reach if the problem was 
transformed into a familiar one. This experiment was similar to the first experiment, except 
that the infants were first shown that the toy and the cloth were attached to each other. That is, 
at the start of the experiment and before each test trial, the experimenter held the toy up so that 
infants could see the cloth dangling from it. Presumably, infants would thereafter view the toy 
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and the attached cloth as a single composite object (i.e., a single object with two distinct parts). 
Because infants should have considerable means-end experience with composite objects (e.g., 
grasping a nursing bottle to bring the nipple to the mouth) by 6 months of age, they should 
have less difficulty in determining what action to perform with the composite object to retrieve 
the toy. Indeed, the results supported this hypothesis, showing, in contrast to the first 
experiment, that the 6.5-month-old infants produced significantly more means-end than non-
means-end solutions to the support problem. 
In a third experiment, Aguiar and her colleagues (2001) found that 6.5-month-old 
infants were also successful at pulling a cloth to attain a distant toy when first given the 
opportunity to watch an experimenter demonstrate the solution to the problem. In this study, 
the experimenter placed the toy on the far end of the cloth and then demonstrated the action 
sequence of pulling the cloth and then grasping the toy once it was within reach. Importantly, 
6.5-month-old infants were not successful at retrieving the toy when the experimenter placed 
the toy next to her, rather than on the cloth, before demonstrating the action sequence of 
pulling the cloth and grasping the toy. In this control condition, the action of pulling the cloth 
was no longer a means to retrieve the toy. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 6.5-
month-old infants succeeded after seeing the experimenter solve the means-end support task, 
not because they simply imitated the experimenter’s actions, but rather, because they 
interpreted these actions as a means to retrieve the toy. When young infants are able to link a 
problem to previous experience or acquire experience through a familiarization process they 
may overcome experiential limitations and succeed in means-end support tasks. If this is the 
case, then overcoming experiential limitations may also be the key for young infants to 
succeed in traditional means-end search tasks. 
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The primary goal of the three experiments reported here was to examine and provide an 
empirical test of the experiential limitation hypothesis with respect to means-end search tasks. 
Experiment 1 was designed to validate the basic paradigm by examining whether 8.5-, but not 
6.5-month-old infants, are able to solve a traditional means-end search task. Experiment 2 
examined whether 6.5-month-old infants are more likely to search for a hidden toy when the 
task is made familiar to them (i.e., the toy and occluder are first presented as a single 
composite object). Experiment 3 examined whether 6.5-month-old infants are able to solve a 
traditional means-end search task after being given the opportunity to watch an experimenter 
demonstrate the solution to the task.  
 A secondary goal of the present research is to provide a more detailed analysis of 
infants’ behavior in means-end search tasks. Failure to solve such a problem does not 
necessarily mean that infants younger than 8 months are not able to act on the occluder. In fact, 
beginning at 6 months of age, infants often do act on the occluder, although their actions are 
typically not judged to be a means to an end (e.g., Willatts, 1984, 1989; Piaget 1954). 
Successful means-end solutions require that problem-solvers evaluate an initial problem and 
take action to reduce the difference between the problem and their ultimate goal (DeLoache, 
Miller, & Pierroutsakos, 1997). It is often difficult, given the absence of language in infants to 
determine whether the problem solvers’ actions reflect behaviors that are intentionally directed 
at achieving the goal. Systematic analysis of behavior in means-end search tasks may, 
however, provide a basis from which intentionality can be inferred. 
 Piaget (1954) proposed three phases for the development of means-end search, 
culminating at approximately 9 months of age: (1) an initial phase in which the infant makes 
no attempt to search; (2) a transitional phase in which the infant removes the occluder but is 
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unaware of the hidden object (i.e., fails to look at the object when it becomes visible or is 
surprised to find the object); and, (3) an intentional phase in which the infant is aware of the 
object and removes the occluder to find it. According to Piaget, these phases of search 
behavior reflect infants’ developing understanding of object permanence. Specifically, 
intentional search behavior is indicative of an infant’s recognition that an object continues to 
exist when hidden, whereas transitional or no search behavior is indicative of a deficiency in an 
infant’s understanding of object permanence.  
 Piaget’s (1954) phases of search behavior indicate that the manner in which the infants 
are searching may be used as a marker of a successful means-end solution. In particular, the 
work of Piaget, Willatts (1984, 1999), and Aguiar et al. (2002), therefore, suggest several 
behaviours that can be used as indicators of success means-end search. First, infants producing 
behaviors representing means-end searches should be more efficient at retrieving a hidden 
object. More efficient responses should thus translate into shorter delays to retrieve the toy, 
more visual focus on the occluder and the toy (as opposed to elsewhere in the experimental 
room), and more behaviours relevant to attaining the goal, such as reaching for, grasping and 
removing the occluder, as opposed to irrelevant behaviors such as banging the experimental 
table (e.g., Aguiar et al., 2001, Willatts, 1984, 1999). Second, infants producing means-end 
searches should anticipate the appearance of the object becoming visible once the occluder is 
removed. According to Piaget (1954) and Willatts (1984), such behavior is perhaps the most 
important indication of deliberate search. To measure infants’ anticipation of the toy becoming 
visible the latency time between when the toy first becomes visible and the infant’s first look at 
the toy can be examined. In contrast, infants producing behaviors representing non-means-end 
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searches should be unaware of the consequences of pulling the occluder and thus should be 




The purpose of this experiment was to validate the procedures used in the subsequent 
experiments by replicating Piaget’s original observations that only infants older than 8 months 
of age will search for an object once it is hidden behind an occluder. The resulting observations 
should also provide a basis to establish the behavioral characteristics of clearly successful 
means-end search solutions. According to Piaget (1954), 8.5-month-old infants should be 
aware of the location of the hidden object and remove the occluder for the purpose of 
retrieving the toy and thus produce behaviours representing means-end search. In contrast, 6.5-
month-old infants should fail to remove the occluder, or else remove the occluder without 
being aware that it will reveal the toy, and thus produce behaviours representing non-means-
end search. As such, reviewing infants’ actions on the occluder should determine whether these 
actions represented a deliberate attempt to retrieve the toy (means-end search) or were 
produced for reasons other than retrieving the toy, such as playing with the occluder or 
accidentally bumping it (non-means-end search). 
 In this experiment, 8.5-month-old infants were predicted to be more deliberate, relative 
to the 6.5-month-old infants, in their actions of attaining a toy placed behind the occluder. The 
older infants should therefore produce more behaviors that represent means-end searches and 
have more test trials categorized as means-end than the younger infants. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of retrieving the hidden object should correspond to behaviours that represent 
means-end searches, such that infants that deliberately retrieve the toy should show shorter 
delays to get the toy, display more visual focus on the occluder and the toy, and have a higher 
proportion of behaviours that are relevant to attaining the goal, (i.e., reaching for, grasping and 
removing the occluder). Anticipation of the appearance of the object becoming visible once the 
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occluder is removed should be reflected in shorter latencies between the point at which the toy 
first becomes visible and the point when the infant first looks at the toy. 
Method 
Participants  
Thirty-one healthy term infants were tested and coded for Experiment 1; 16 8.5-month-
old infants (8 male and 8 female), ranging in age from 253 to 272 days (M = 262.19, SD = 5.4) 
and 15 6.5-month-old infants (8 male and 7 female), ranging in age from 186 to 209 days (M = 
195.8, SD = 7.4). An additional 6 infants were tested and eliminated from the experiment 
because they failed to complete four valid test trials: 4 due to lack of interest in the toy and 2 
due to fussiness.  
The names of the infants tested in this and the following experiments were obtained 
from birth announcements in a local newspaper. Parents were contacted by letter and follow-up 
phone calls. Parents were not compensated for their participation, but were given a certificate 
and a small toy for their infant.  
Apparatus and Materials 
 The means-end search tasks were presented at a table with a light blue Formica top 
measuring 122 cm in width and 117 cm in length (see Figure 1). There was an opening along 
the front edge of the table, 34 cm deep and 30.5 cm wide into which the infant was placed. 
Parents held their infants on their lap while sitting on a desk chair with wheels and adjustable 
height. The toys used included a colorful plastic toy dog that was 10.5 cm wide, 3.5 cm thick, 
and 12 cm high, and a colorful plastic butterfly measuring 17.5 cm wide, 4 cm thick and14 cm 
high. The toy dog produced a barking and/or laughing sound when pressure was applied to a 
button on its front, and had a small bell tied around its neck that jingled when it was shaken. 
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was shaken. To allow each toy to stand upright, they were mounted on a white rectangular 
plastic base measuring 8 cm wide, 10 cm deep and 0.6 cm thick.  
A freestanding L-shaped occluder, 25 cm wide and 18 cm high, made of metal netting 
covered with grey felt cloth was used to occlude the toy during the experiment. The occluder 
had a horizontal rectangular base on one side, measuring 22.5 cm wide and 12 cm deep, on 
which the toy was placed during the experiment. On the side opposite to this base were three 
semi-circle handles made from grey felt cloth; one measuring 13 cm wide and 12 cm long was 
sewn to the top edge of the occluder, and the others, measuring 4 cm wide and 7 cm long, were 
sewn to each side of the occluder, 3 cm above its base. The handles were used to bring the 
occluder down and to turn it to reveal the toy that had been positioned its base. 
Procedure 
 At the start of the testing session, parents were asked to roll their chair forward so that 
the infant sitting in their lap would face the front of the testing table, and be positioned in the 
table recess, surrounded by the table surface. Parents were instructed to neither interact with 
their infants, nor react to their infants’ actions during the experiment. The majority of parents 
who participated complied with these instructions. In those instances in which parents 
interacted with their infants during the testing session, a gentle reminder from the experimenter 
was sufficient to gain compliance. The experimenter sat on a chair to the infant’s right side. 
Each infant received a familiarization trial, three practice trials, and then four test trials. At the 
start of each trial, the experimenter held the occluder and the toy side-by-side, centered at the 
baby’s eye-line (approximately 20 cm above the table). The experimenter held the occluder in 
her left hand and the toy in her right hand. The experimenter then directed the infants’ attention 
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to the occluder and the toy by shaking each of these items, and saying “Look at the cover.” and 
“Look at the toy”. 
Familiarization Trial. In the familiarization trial, the experimenter placed the occluder 
and the toy on the table at the infant’s midline and within the infant’s reach. The infant was 
allowed to play with the occluder and the toy for approximately 30 seconds. The 
familiarization trial was designed to ensure that the infant was interested in the toy.  
Practice Trials. The practice trials were designed as an opportunity for the experimenter 
to establish a rapport with the infant and for the infant to become comfortable with the 
experimental setting and task. In the first of three practice trials, the experimenter placed the 
occluder on the table (approximately 20 cm from the edge of the table), with the base of the 
occluder facing the infant, but beyond the infant’s reach. Next, the experimenter placed the toy 
on the base of the occluder, and then moved the occluder and toy within the infant’s reach 
(approximately 10 cm from the edge of the table). The infant was then encouraged to retrieve 
the toy (e.g., “Can you get it?”). If the infant retrieved the toy he/she received a positive verbal 
reinforcement (e.g., “Good for you, you got it!”), and was allowed to play with the toy for 
approximately 30 seconds. If the infant failed to act on the occluder and looked away for more 
than 2 seconds, the experimenter redirected the infant’s attention by tapping the toy. The 
second practice trial was similar to the first, except that before moving the occluder and toy 
within the infant’s reach, the experimenter turned the occluder 90 degrees clockwise, so that 
the toy and occluder were facing to the left of the infant. In the third practice trial, the occluder 
was turned 90 degrees counter-clockwise, so that the toy and occluder were facing to the right 
of the infant. 
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Test Trials. At the start of each test trial, the experimenter placed the occluder on the 
table (approximately 20 cm from the edge of the table), with the base of the occluder facing the 
infant, but beyond the infant’s reach. Next, ensuring that the infant was watching, the 
experimenter placed the toy on the base of the occluder and turned it clockwise until the toy 
was completely hidden, and then moved the occluder and toy within the infant’s reach 
(approximately 10 cm from the edge of the table). The infant was then encouraged to retrieve 
the toy (e.g., “Can you get it?”). If the infant retrieved the toy he/she received a positive verbal 
reinforcement (e.g., “Good for you, you got it!”), and was allowed to play with the toy for 
approximately 30 seconds. If the infant failed to act on the occluder and looked away for 
several seconds, the experimenter attempted to redirect the infant’s attention by tapping the top 
of the occluder or snapping her fingers in front of the occluder. If the infant failed to retrieve 
the toy after 30 s the experimenter terminated the trial by removing the occluder and the toy 
from the table.  
The infants’ actions during both the familiarization and test trials were videotaped 
using two cameras. One video camera was directed at the infant’s face to record the direction 
of the infant’s eye gaze and the infant’s hand actions on the occluder and toy. The second 
video camera was placed on the ceiling and directed down onto the experimental table to 
record the infant’s head movements and hand actions on the occluder and toy that were not 
visible from the perspective of the first camera. 
Data Scoring 
Toy interest rating of familiarization trials. A coder independently viewed the 
videotaped test trials of each infant and rated how interested in the toy the infant was during 
the familiarization trial using a scale of 1 (low interest) to 5 (high interest). Coders were 
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instructed to look at the infants’ behaviors with the toy and the occluder and to consider 
infants’ interest in the toy based on their actions and facial expressions. Coders were instructed 
to consider infants who spent the majority of the familiarization trial playing with the toy to be 
interested in the toy and to rate the infant’s interest as a 4 or 5. For infants who spent a 
majority of the familiarization trail playing with the occluder, coders were instructed to rate the 
level of interest in the toy as a 1 or 2. 
Means-end rating of test trials. Two coders, one of whom was naïve to the purpose of 
the research, independently viewed the videotaped test trials of each infant and rated how 
clearly the infant appeared to be acting on the occluder as a means to retrieve the toy. The 
coders used a scale from 1 (clearly not means-end) to 5 (clearly means-end). Coders were 
instructed to view the videotaped trials twice, first in normal speed and then in slow motion. 
Following the second viewing of the trial, means-end ratings were assigned. Coders were given 
no specific criteria regarding which behaviors were to be considered means-end and which 
were to be considered non-means-end, with the exception that trials in which the infants pulled 
the occluder and brought the occluder to their mouths were to be coded as 1 (clearly not 
means-end).  
Trials that received a score of 4 or 5 by both coders were categorized as means-end, 
and trials that received a score of 1 or 2 by both coders were categorized as non-means-end. 
Trials that received a score of 3 by both coders were considered ambiguous and were excluded 
from the analyses. Trials in which the coders were in disagreement regarding the means-end 
categorization were viewed and scored by a third coder, also naïve to the purposes of the 
research. Any trials that received a score of 3 (unable to code) by the third coder were not 
categorized and excluded from the analyses.  
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Coding of manual and visual responses. A fourth coder, also naïve to the purpose of the 
research, used Observer-Pro 4.0 software (Noldus, Trienes, Hendriksen, Jansen, & Jansen, 
2000) to view and code the test trials of each infant frame-by-frame to record the duration of 
each trial, as well as the frequency and duration of every hand action and change in eye-gaze 
direction. To assess reliability of this coding, a fifth coder conducted the same recording of 
behaviors for 25% of the infants in each age group (i.e., 4 out of the 16 infants in each age 
group).Each trial began when the occluder was turned around and the toy completely hidden 
from the infant. Each trial ended when the toy was touched directly by the infant, or after 30 s 
had elapsed. The recording of the infants’ manual and visual response time recordings was 
precise to one-hundredth of a second.  
The detailed analyses obtained from the coding of the video tapes were used to examine 
the differences between the search behaviors of the 8.5-month-old infants and those of the 6.5-
month-old infants and between test trials in which the infants’ behaviors were categorized as 
means-end and those trials in which the infants’ behaviors were categorized as non-means-end. 
Behavioral measures were examined in two categories: 1) efficiency at retrieving a hidden 
object; and 2) anticipation of revealing a hidden object. To evaluate infants’ efficiency at 
retrieving a hidden object, three behavioral measures were analyzed: the latency between the 
beginning of the test trial and infants’ first touch of the toy (i.e., trial duration); the proportion 
of visual attention spent focused goal-oriented (i.e., toy and occluder) and non-goal oriented 
(i.e., parent, experimenter and other elements in the experimental room) elements; and, the 
proportion of manual behaviors spent executing goal-oriented (i.e., reaching and touching the 
occluder, touching the toy) versus non-goal-oriented (i.e., no action, playing with the occluder 
by swinging it in the air). The behavioral measure analyzed to evaluate infants’ anticipation of 
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the hidden object becoming visible was the latency between the toy becoming visible and the 
infants’ first look at the toy. 
Results and Discussion 
 
The first two coders were in disagreement about the means-end categorization of 8 of 
the 64 (12.5%) test trials for the 8.5-month-old infants and 11 of the 60 trials (18.3 %) for the 
6.5-month-old infants. The third coder reviewed and rated these 19 trials and, as a result, 3 
trials for the 8.5-month-old infants and 4 trials for the 6.5-month-old infants were excluded 
from further analysis because of their ambiguity. The analyses of Experiment 1 therefore, 
included 62 trials by 8.5-month-old infants and 56 trials by 6.5-month-old infants. The two 
coders of the video tapes were reliable within 0.18 s of all behaviours, and 0.05 for 80 % of the 
behaviours. 
Differences between 8.5- and 6.5-month-old infants 
 
The means-end ratings revealed, as predicted, that the 8.5-month-old infants produced 
reliably more test trials reflecting means-end search behavior than the 6.5-month-old infants 
(see Table 1). The magnitude of this difference was quite large, with 83.9 % (52/62) means-
end trials produced by 8.5-month-old infants, and only 14.3 % (8/56) means-end trials 
produced by the 6.5-month-old infants, (Fischer’s exact test, p < .0001). A repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess whether the ratings of infants’ search 
behavior changed over successive trials. Analyses revealed that the means-end ratings were not 
affected by trial for either the 8.5-month-old infants, F (3, 45) = 1.13, MSE = 1.94, p = n.s., or 
the 6.5-month-old infants, F < 1, MSE = .96.  (See Table 2 for the breakdown of means-end 
categorization by trial). Additionally, the 8.5-month-old group produced more means-end trials 
per infant (M = 3.19, SD = 0.91) than the 6.5-month-old group (M = .53, SD = 1.06), F (1, 29)  
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= 56.14, MSE = 0.97, p < .001. Therefore, at both the group and individual level, 8.5-month-
old infants appear to be more likely to act on the occluder as a means to retrieve the toy than 
6.5-month-old infants. These results replicate Piaget’s (1954) original observations and offer 
validation of the procedure used in subsequent experiments. 
Efficiency at retrieving a hidden object 
 For each of the three measures examined in this section (trial duration, visual attention, 
and manual goal actions), 2 X 4 (age X trial) mixed analysis of variances (ANOVAs), with age 
as the between-subjects variable and trial as the within-subjects variable, were conducted to 
examine the effects of trial and age. These analyses revealed no significant main effects of trial 
or any significant trial by age interactions for any of the above measures. As expected, main 
effects of age were found for all three measures, with 8.5-month-old infants having shorter trial 
durations, and a greater proportion of their time spent engaged in goal-oriented visual attention 
and behaviour. See Table 3 for the results of these 3 mixed ANOVAs. For ease of presentation, 
these data were collapsed across trial for all subsequent analyses.  
 To provide converging evidence that behaviors measuring efficiency at retrieving a 
hidden object reflect means-end behaviors, these behaviors were directly compared for trials 
categorized as means-end and those considered non-means-end. Only 8.5-month-old infants 
were included in this comparison to avoid any confounding effects of age.  Analysis of latency 
between the beginning of the test trial and the infants’ first touch of the toy revealed that trials 
categorized as means-end were indeed significantly shorter in duration (M = 7.23 s, SD = 4.79 
s) than trials categorized as non-means-end (M = 21.69 s, SD = 11.01 s), F (1, 60) = 46.52, 
MSE = 37.68, p < .001. Over the course of the trial, infants producing behaviors categorized as 
means-end spent a greater proportion of time focused on elements deemed to be goal-oriented 
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(M = .85, SD = .20) on those trials than on trials categorized as non-means-end (M = .46, SD = 
.22), F (1, 60) = 28.80, MSE = .04, p < .001. In contrast, on trials categorized as means-end, 
infants spent a greater proportion of time executing behaviors deemed to be goal-oriented (M = 
.64, SD = .25) than on those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = .30, SD = .34), F (1, 60) 
= 14.12, MSE = .07, p < .001 (see Figure 2). The above results confirm the predictions that 
infants producing means-end searches are more efficient in their behaviors, even among older  
infants with high overall levels of means-end search performance, than infants of the same age 
producing non-means-end searches.   
Anticipation of revealing the hidden object 
 
 For the measure of anticipation (latency between the toy becoming visible and the 
infants’ first look at the toy) a 2 X 4 (age X trial) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted, with age as the between-subjects variable and trial as the within-subjects variable, 
to test for effects of trial and age. This analysis revealed that neither the main effect of trial, nor 
any significant interaction involving trial for any of the anticipation measure.  As expected, 
however, there was a main effect of age, with 8.5-month-old infants having shorter latency 
between the toy becoming visible and their first look to the toy, relative to the 6.5 month-old 
infants. See Table 3 for the results of this mixed ANOVA. For ease of presentation, these data 
were collapsed across trial for all subsequent analyses. 
To provide converging evidence that anticipation behavior reflects means-end 
behaviors, the anticipation measure was directly compared for trials categorized as means-end 
and those considered non-means-end. As above, only 8.5-month-old infants were included in 
this comparison to avoid any confounding effects of age. An analysis of the latency between 






















Figure 2.  Proportion of test trials spent on goal-oriented behaviors and attention in means-end 
and non-means-end trials for 8.5-month-old-infants in Experiment 1.  
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means-end had latencies that were significantly shorter in duration (M = .33 s, SD = .79 s) than 
those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = 1.89 s, SD = 1.01 s), F (1, 116) = 25.66, MSE = 
.85, p < .001 (see Figure 3). This result confirms the prediction that infants producing means-
end searches would show more anticipation toward the location in which the toy was due to 
appear and, thus quickly direct their eye gaze to that location while removing the occluder. The 
contrast observed in the non-means-end search trials suggests that infants may sometimes be 
unaware of the consequences of pulling the occluder, and therefore be more likely to focus on 
elements other than the location where the toy will become visible. The anticipation results 
provide crucial validation that the coding scheme employed to measure these behaviors 
provides a close reflection of means-end search performance. 
 The fact that the majority of searches deemed to reflect the 8.5-month-old infants 
performed means-end behaviors is consistent with Piaget’s (1954) classic observations. 
Accordingly, the search related characteristics established by the detailed behavioral analysis 
in this experiment provide a basis to identify behavior patterns that reflect deliberate searches, 
and may thus, be used as a benchmark for evaluating search behaviors in younger infants. If 
the behavioral patterns found in the 8.5-month-old infants in Experiment 1 emerge in the 6.5-
month-old infants in Experiments 2 and 3, this would indicate that such infants are indeed 













Figure 3.  Latency between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first look at the toy in 




The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess whether 6.5-month-old infants succeed at a means-
end search task if the task is transformed from a problem that they have little or no experience 
with to one that is familiar. The experiential limitation hypothesis suggests that when the toy 
and the occluder are separate, as in Piaget’s (1954) original task, the solution of using the 
occluder as a means to retrieve the toy does not readily occur to young infants because it is not 
yet part of their experience with the physical world. However, when the toy and the occluder 
are attached, infants may be more likely to view them as a single composite object, something 
that infants younger than 8 months of age expect to move as a whole (e.g., Needham, 1999; 
Needham, Baillargeon, & Kaufman, 1997; Spelke, Breinlinger,  Jacobson, & Phillips, 1993). 
Given this, and the fact that 6.5-month-old infants have experience playing and manipulating 
one object, they should have no difficulty in determining what action to perform on the 
occluder to retrieve the toy attached to it (Aguiar et al., 2002). Thus, attaching the toy to the 
occluder should transform the traditional means-end search task into one that 6.5-month-old 
infants have experience with, and thus, facilitate their ability to act on the occluder as a means 
to reveal the toy.  
 The prediction that 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 2 will deliberately act on the 
occluder to retrieve the toy more than those of the same age from Experiment 1 would be 
confirmed if the infants in Experiment 2 produced more behaviors representing means-end 
searches, both as a group and individually, than those who received the traditional means-end 
search task in Experiment 1. The pattern of differences in the duration and latency of visual 
and manual responses between means-end searches and non-means-end searches should also 
reflect goal-oriented behavior and therefore have similar behavior characteristics as the 
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corresponding trials in Experiment 1. Thus, as in Experiment 1, infants should be more 
efficient at retrieving the hidden object when producing behaviors representing means-end 
searches (i.e., shorter delays to retrieve the toy, more visual focus on the occluder and the toy, 
and more behaviors relevant to attaining the goal, such as reaching for, grasping, and removing 
the occluder), and anticipate the appearance of the object becoming visible once the occluder is 
removed (i.e., shorter latency between when the toy first becomes visible and the infant’s first 
look at the toy and shorter latency between the infant’s first look at the toy and his or her first 




Fifteen healthy term 6.5-month-old infants (7 male and 8 female), ranging in age from 
188 days to 212 days (M = 200.87 days, SD = 8.49 days) were tested and coded. An additional 
3 infants were tested and eliminated from the experiment because they failed to complete four 
valid test trials: 1 due to lack of interest in the toy, and 2 due to fussiness. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 The apparatus and materials were similar to those used for Experiment 1, with the 
exception that the toy was attached to the base and back of the occluder to form a single 
composite object. 
Procedure 
The procedure used was similar to that used in Experiment 1, except that the 
experimenter held up the occluder in her left hand, prior to the beginning of each trial to allow 
the infant to see that the toy was attached to the occluder. The experimenter directed the 
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infants’ attention to the occluder and the toy by shaking the occluder, causing the toy to 
produce a noise.  
Data Scoring 
The same rating scales and procedures for scoring toy interest and means-end 
categorization were used in this experiment as in Experiment 1, as was the coding of manual 
and visual responses. 
Results and Discussion 
 
In this experiment, the two coders were in disagreement about the means-end 
categorization in 10 of the 60 (16.67 %) test trials. A third coder reviewed and rated these 10 
trials. With this additional rating, 2 trials remained ambiguous and were, thus, excluded from 
the analyses. Therefore, the analyses of Experiment 2 include 58 of the possible 60 test trials. 
The two coders of the video tapes were reliable within 0.15 s of all behaviours, and 0.02 for 80 
% of the behaviours. 
Performance of the 6.5-month-old infants   
As predicted, the means-end ratings revealed that the 6.5-month-old infants in the toy-
attached condition of Experiment 2 produced reliably more test trials categorized as means-end 
search than the same age group in Experiment 1 who performed in the traditional search task 
(see Table 1). In Experiment 2, 53.4% (31/58) of the trials produced by the 6.5-month-old 
infants were categorized as means-end, a greater than three-fold increase over that (14.3%) 
produced by the same age infants in Experiment 1 (Fischer’s exact test, p < .001). As in 
Experiment 1, the means-end ratings did not change across successive trials, F (3, 42) < 1 (see 
Table 2 for the breakdown of means-end categorization by trial). Additionally, compared to the 
6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 1, those in Experiment 2 had more trials per infant 
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categorized as means-end (M = 2.07, SD = 1.16 for Experiment 2 and M = .53, SD = 1.06 for 
Experiment 1), F (1, 28) = 14.24, MSE = 1.24, p = .001. Therefore, as a group and 
individually, the 6.5-month-old infants who received the toy-attached means-end search task 
appeared to be acting on the occluder as a means to retrieve the toy more often than same age 
infants who received a traditional two-object search task.  
Efficiency at retrieving a hidden object 
 To evaluate these young infants’ efficiency at retrieving a hidden object, three 
behavioral measures were analyzed: the latency between the beginning of the test trial and 
infants’ first touch of the toy; the proportion of visual attention spent focused on elements 
related to the task versus elements not related to the task; and, the proportion of manual 
behaviors spent executing goal-oriented versus non-goal-oriented actions. For each of the 
above measures, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to examine if any effect of trial 
was present. No main effect of trial was found for any of the above measures; therefore data 
were collapsed across test trial for the following analyses. See Table 4 for a breakdown of 
these results. 
 Analysis of latency between the beginning of the test trial and infants’ first touch of the 
toy revealed that trials categorized as means-end had latencies that were significantly shorter in 
duration (M = 9.48 s, SD = 5.43 s) than those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = 21.96 
s, SD = 8.30 s), F (1, 58) = 49.09, MSE = 47.11, p < .001. Over the course of the trial, infants 
that produced behaviors categorized as means-end spent a greater proportion of time focused 
on elements that were deemed to be goal-oriented (i.e., the occluder or toy) (M = .88, SD = .15) 
than those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = .62, SD = .29), F (1, 58) = 19.65, MSE = 
.05, p < .001. Infants producing behaviors categorized as means-end spent a greater proportion  
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of time executing behaviors deemed to be goal-oriented (i.e., reaching and touching the 
occluder, touching the toy) (M = .64, SD = .22) than infants producing behaviors categorized as  
non-means-end (M = .32, SD = .23), F (1, 58) = 29.76, MSE = .05, p < .001. The above results 
confirm the predictions that infants producing means-end searches were more efficient in their 
behaviors than infants producing non-means-end searches (see Figure 4). In fact, the findings 
for the trials categorized means-end produced by the 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 2 did 
not differ from those of the trials categorized means-end produced by the 8.5-month-old infants 
in Experiment 2. See Table 5 for a breakdown of the results. 
Anticipation of revealing the hidden object 
 To evaluate the infants’ anticipation of the hidden object becoming visible, the latency 
between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first look at the toy was analyzed. A 
repeated measure ANOVA was conducted to examine if any effect of trial. No main effect of 
trial was found for the anticipation measure; therefore, these data were collapsed across test 
trial (see Table 4). 
An analysis of the latency between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first look 
at the toy revealed that trials categorized as means-end had latencies that were significantly 
shorter in duration (M = .17 s, SD = .16 s) than those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = 
1.17 s, SD = 1.83 s), F (1,51) = 9.73, MSE = 1.27, p = .003 (see Figure 5). These results 
confirm the prediction that infants producing means-end searches anticipated the location in 
which the toy was due to appear and thus, while removing the occluder, directed their eye gaze 
to that location. Further, when this latency measure of the trials categorized as means-end 



















Figure 4.  Proportion of test trials spent on goal-oriented behaviors and attention in means-end 





Table 5. Comparison of means-end trials produced by 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 2 
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Figure 5. Latency between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first look at the toy in 





categorized as means-end produced by the 8.5-month-old infants in Experiment 1, it was found 
that the younger infants were faster to look toward the toy once it became visible (see Table 
5).Thus, taken together, the results of this experiment suggest that when the means-end search 
task is modified to fit within age-appropriate experiences, infants as young as 6.5-month-old 




Experiment 3 addressed the question of whether 6.5-month-old infants are able to solve a 
means-end search task, involving two objects (as in Piaget’s original task), when they are first 
shown a demonstration of the solution. It is a well-established finding that infants as young as 
a few hours old will imitate an adult’s actions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). By reproducing 
another’s behaviors, infants gain knowledge about themselves, and their own capacity for 
action (Rochat, 2001).  Infants can use adults as a source of information about what to do with 
objects and their behaviors can be guided by the particular nature of the acts of the adults 
(Meltzoff, 1995). Following this rationale, in this experiment infants were given an opportunity 
to watch an experimenter demonstrate the solution to the search task (means-end 
demonstration) before they were given an opportunity to search. To ensure that the 6.5-month-
old infants were not simply imitating the action of pulling the occluder, without realizing the 
means-end relationship between pulling the occluder and retrieving the toy, an additional 
group of infants was tested. This second group of infants first viewed a similar demonstration 
involving the pulling of the occluder, except that now pulling the occluder was no longer a 
means to reveal the toy (non-means-end demonstration), but would instead reveal a beige 
divider. 
Infants who view the means-end demonstration are expected to produce more behaviors 
representing means-end searches, as a group and as individuals, than infants who view the non-
means-end demonstration. As in the first two experiments, the differences between behaviors 








Sixteen healthy term 6.5-month-old infants, (8 male and 8 female), ranging in age from 
189 days to 217 days (M = 201.3 days, SD = 7.0 days) were tested and coded in the means-end 
demonstration condition. Sixteen healthy term 6.5-month-old infants, (8 male and 8 female), 
ranging in age from 188 days to 209 days (M = 201.6 days, SD = 6.3 days) were tested and 
coded in the non-means-end demonstration condition. An additional 7 infants were tested and 
eliminated from the experiment because they failed to complete four valid test trials: 4 due to 
lack of interest in the toy, and 3 due to fussiness. 
Apparatus and Materials 
 The apparatus and materials were identical to those used for Experiment 1 with the 
addition of a beige divider, 12 cm wide, and 18 cm high, which was placed on the far end of 
the table during the non-means-end demonstration task. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that used for Experiment 1 except that the experimenter 
provided either a means-end demonstration or a non-means-end demonstration three times 
before the first test trial and once before each subsequent test trial. In the means-end 
demonstration, the experimenter (1) placed the occluder on the table; (2) placed the toy on the 
base of the occluder; (3) turned the occluder clockwise, hiding the toy; (4) grabbed the large 
handle of the occluder; (5) pulled the handle down to reveal the toy; and, finally, (6) retrieved 
the toy. In the non-means-end demonstration, the experimenter (1) placed the toy behind the 
beige divider, hiding it; (2) placed the occluder on the table in front of the beige divider, hiding 
it; (3) turned the occluder clockwise; (4) grabbed the large handle of the occluder; (5) pulled 
the handle of the occluder handle down to reveal the divider; and, finally (6) retrieved the toy 
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from the behind the divider. It is important to note that the non-means-end demonstration was 
similar to the means-end demonstration in that the experimenter pulled the occluder and 
retrieved the toy; however, the action of pulling the occluder is no longer a means to reveal the 
toy because the toy was hidden behind the beige divider.  
Data Scoring 
The rating scales and procedure used for Experiment 1 for scoring toy interest and 
means-end categorization were employed for this experiment. Similarly, the coding of manual 
and visual responses was completed as in the previous experiments. 
Results and Discussion 
 
It was found that the two coders were in disagreement about the means-end 
categorization in 7 of the 64 (10.09%) test trials for the means-end demonstration condition 
and 12 of the 64 trials (18.75 %) for the non-means-end demonstration condition. A third coder 
reviewed and rated these 19 trials and as a result 2 trials for the means-end demonstration 
condition and no trial for the non-means-end demonstration condition remained ambiguous and 
were, thus, excluded from the analyses. Therefore, the analyses of Experiment 2 include 62 
trials for the means-end demonstration condition and 64 trials for the non-means-end 
demonstration condition. The two coders of the videotapes were reliable within 0.45 s of all 
behaviours, and 0.05 for 80 % of the behaviours. 
Differences between the means-end and non-means-end conditions    
As predicted, the means-end ratings revealed that the infants who viewed the means-
end demonstration produced reliably more test trials in which their behaviours were considered 
reflective of means-end searches than the infants who viewed the non-means-end 
demonstration (see Table 1). Of the 62 trials produced by the infants in the means-end 
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demonstration condition, 34 were categorized as means-end, whereas only 17 of the 64 trials 
produced by the infants in the non-means-end demonstration condition were categorized as 
means-end (Fischer’s exact test, p = .002). The means-end ratings were not affected by trial for 
the means-end demonstration condition, F (3, 45) < 1, nor the non-means-end demonstration 
condition, F (3, 45) < 1. See Table 2 for the breakdown of means-end categorization by trial. 
Additionally, compared to non-means-end demonstration condition, the infants in the means-
end demonstration condition had more trials per infant categorized as means-end (M = 2.13, 
SD = 1.30) for the means-end demonstration condition and (M = 1.06, SD = 1.29) for the non-
means-end demonstration condition, F (1, 30) = 5.80, MSE = 1.56, p = .022. Therefore, as a 
group and individually, the 6.5-month-old infants who viewed the means-end demonstration 
appeared to be acting on the occluder as a means to retrieve the toy more often than the same 
infants who viewed the non-means-end demonstration. 
Efficiency at retrieving a hidden object 
 For each of the three behavioural measures, a 2 X 4 (condition X trial) mixed ANOVA, 
with condition as the between-subjects variable and trial as the within-subjects variable was 
conducted to examine if any effect of trial or condition was present. No significant main effects 
of trial or condition, nor any interaction of trial by condition, were found for any of the 
efficiency measures; therefore, data were collapsed across test trial and condition for the 
following analyses. See Table 6 for a breakdown of these mixed ANOVA findings. 
 Analysis of latency between the beginning of the test trial and infants’ first touch of the 
toy revealed that trials categorized as means-end had latencies that were significantly shorter in 
duration (M = 9.02 s, SD = 4.55 s) than those trials categorized as non-means-end (M = 17.86 
s, SD = 9.14 s), F (1,123) = 40.77, MSE = 58.02, p < .001. Over the course of the trial, infants  
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producing behaviors categorized as means-end spent a greater proportion of time focused on 
elements deemed to be goal-oriented (i.e., the occluder or toy) (M = .87, SD = .14) than trials 
categorized as non-means-end (M = .67, SD = .20), F (1, 124) = 46.38, MSE = .03, p < .001 
(see Figure 6). Infants producing trials categorized as means-end spent a greater proportion of 
time executing behaviors deemed to be goal-oriented (i.e., reaching and touching the occluder, 
touching the toy) (M = .67, SD = .24) than infants producing trials categorized as non-means-
end (M = .53, SD = .29), F (1,124) = 9.00, MSE = .08, p = .004. These results provide support 
for the hypothesis that infants producing means-end searches are more efficient in their 
behaviors than infants producing non-means-end searches.   
Anticipation of revealing the hidden object 
 For the latency measure examining anticipation of revealing the hidden object, a 2 X 4 
(condition X trial) mixed ANOVA, with age as the between-subjects variable and trial as the 
within-subjects variable was conducted to examine if any effect of trial or condition was 
present. No significant main effects of trial or condition, or any interaction of trial by condition 
were found for the above measure; therefore, data were collapsed across test trial and 
condition. See Table 6 for a breakdown of these mixed ANOVA findings. 
First, analysis of the latency between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first 
look at the toy revealed that trials categorized as means-end had latencies that were 
significantly shorter in duration (M = .34 s, SD = .54 s) than those trials categorized as non-


























Figure 6.  Proportion of test trials spent on goal-oriented behaviors and attention in means-end 
and non-means-end trials for in Experiment 3. 
Behaviors Visual Attention 
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See Figure 7. This result suggests that 6.5-month-old infants benefited from viewing general 
demonstrations of means-end search (i.e., either the means-end or non-means-end condition) 
and produced means-end searches in which they anticipated the location in which the toy will 
appear and thus, while removing the occluder, directed their eye gaze and motor responses to 















Figure 7.  Latency between the toy becoming visible and the infants’ first look at the toy in 





The research presented here was designed to examine the experiential limitation hypothesis. 
The corresponding proposal addresses the discrepancy that exists between Piaget’s (1954) 
observation that infants younger than 8 months of age fail to search for an object that becomes 
hidden by an occluder, and the research findings obtained using the violation-of expectation 
paradigm (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1990), 
which suggest that infants much younger than 8 months of age possess the conceptual and 
motor abilities needed to perform means-end tasks. According to this experiential limitation 
hypothesis, young infants fail to search because such a task requires acting on one object as a 
means to achieve a goal involving a second object, and young infants typically have little 
experience with such a task. Infants younger than 8 months of age are unfamiliar with 
problems involving acting on one object as a means to retrieve a second object; thus, the 
solution to such problems does not spontaneously occur to them. The theoretical implications 
of the experiential limitation hypothesis differ from those of Piaget’s work in an important 
way. The proposed experiential limitation hypothesis holds the fundamental assumption that 
search behavior is an index of infants’ ability to use one object as a means of achieving a goal 
involving a second object, and is not only an index of infants’ understanding about the 
permanence of occluded objects (see also, Baillargeon, 1993). 
 Taken together, the results of three experiments provide strong support for the 
experiential limitation hypothesis. The first experiment provided a replication of the classic 
observation that 8.5-month-old, but not 6.5-month-old, infants were able to successfully search 
for an occluded object on a majority of test trials. In Experiment 2, using the same basic 
procedure, 6.5-month-old-infants were able to retrieve a toy hidden behind an occluder when 
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the task was transformed to one they had experience solving (i.e., the occluder and toy were 
transformed into one composite object), and were similar in their behaviors as the older infants 
of Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, 6.5-month-old-infants were able to successfully complete 
the means-end search tasks after viewing a demonstration using the occluder to retrieve the 
toy. Furthermore, in Experiments 2 and 3, the 6.5-month-old-infants were able to retrieve the 
toy in a manner that demonstrated an understanding both of how to solve a manual search task, 
and of the fact that the toy was still present even when hidden by the occluder.  
 Converging evidence that young infants’ search performance improved when their 
experiential limitations are overcome was provided by the results of objective measures of 6.5-
month-old infants’ behaviours. The behaviors of the 6.5-month-old infants who successfully 
retrieved the toys (i.e., produced test trials that were categorized as means-end) were similar to 
those found in means-end searches by older 8.5-month-old-infants in Experiment 1. Specially, 
the 6.5-month-old-infants who successfully retrieved the toy from behind the occluder in 
Experiment 2 had more efficient responses (i.e., shorter duration between the start of the test 
trial and their first touch of the toy). Such efficient responses were characterized by the 
production of more goal-relevant behaviours (i.e., reaching for, grasping and removing the 
occluder), and a greater proportion of their attention focused on goal-oriented objects (i.e., the 
toy and occluder) during toy retrieval than test trials in which the infants had been unsuccessful 
in retrieving the toy. Furthermore, 6.5-month-old-infants demonstrated higher levels of 
anticipation regarding the appearance of the toy once they removed the occluder. This 
increased anticipation was marked by shorter latencies between the appearance of the toy and 
their first look at the toy. The significance of these quantitative behavioral results are reflected 
 55
in Piaget’s (1954) and Willatts’ (1984) suggestions that such behaviors are perhaps the most 
important indications of deliberate search.  
 It is interesting to note that while the specific of Experiment 3 had a reliable effect on 
the proportion of means-end search behaviours in 6.5-month-old infants; it did not yield 
significant differences in the objective measures of search efficiency and anticipation. In 
consideration of this, it seems that the novel application of the experience gained by the 
demonstrations in this experiment, though successful overall, may require additional practice 
before by the infant displaying the more direct behaviors of search efficiency and anticipation. 
The 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 2 were led to utilize the occluder in a manner with 
which they were presumed to already have adequate experience. In contrast, the same-age 
infants in Experiment 3 were led to act on the occluder through a demonstration of an action-
sequence with which they were presumed to have very little experience. Therefore, just as a 
young child is still hesitant and shaky during the first successful attempts at riding a bicycle, 
the infants in Experiment 3 may have required more practice or additional demonstrations 
before coming to execute means-end searches in that task with the same confidence and 
efficiency that is typically associated (and shown in Experiments 1 and 2) with means-end 
behaviors. While future research is needed to directly address this possibility, the failure to find 
reliable differences in the converging measures of search efficiency and anticipation does not 
detract from the finding of primary importance in Experiment 3; namely, that 6.5-month-old 
infants are able to perform significantly more successful means-end searches when provided 
with experience regarding how to complete the search.    
The present results cannot be accounted for by an explanation that focuses on 
biological immaturity (e.g., Diamond, 1991; 1997). According to this view, infants between 5 
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and 7 months of age understand the concept that an object continues to exist when hidden, but 
are unable to utilize this understanding in means-end search tasks because the lack of 
maturation of the supplementary motor area of the PFC yields imperfect sequencing of arm and 
hand movements. However, if such a hypothesis were correct, then the 6.5-month-old-infants 
would not have benefited from simply watching a demonstration of the solution in Experiment 
3. It would be quite a feat; indeed, if any deficit that is due to gross immaturity of a brain 
region could be overcome by a few trials of learning.  That infants required very little 
experience with the solution to perform successful search is, thus, quite dramatic in light of the 
biological immaturity argument, as one would expect that young infants’ inability to solve the 
task would be quite resistant to change until the onset of critical period of maturations. 
Accordingly, just as monkeys with PFC lesions show little ability to learn action sequences 
they were previously familiar with (Diamond, 1993), so should infants show little change in 
their ability to quickly learn action sequences if they have immature prefrontal cortices. The 
present results suggest, instead, that 6.5 month-old infants’ ability to successfully perform 
means-end search is not limited by PFC immaturity, because once infants at this young age are 
provided with a little experience with the steps necessary to successfully retrieve an occluded 
object, they produce the means-end sequencing that is necessary to solve the task. 
The present results are also difficult to reconcile with theoretical accounts based on the 
notion that infants younger than 8 months of age do not search for hidden objects and are 
unable to perform means-end action sequences because they are unable to reason about causal 
sequences (e.g., Piaget, 1954; Willatts, 1984). The successful means-end search performance 
of 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 2, for example, suggested that these infants understood 
means-end sequences and manipulated the occluder portion of the composite object attain the 
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interesting part of the object (i.e., the toy). It is important to emphasize that the primary 
difference between the experimental method in Experiment 2, where 6.5-month-old infants 
were successful at retrieving the occluded object, and in Experiment 1 where infants of the 
same age were unsuccessful at retrieving the occluded object, is the fact that in Experiment 1 
infants were shown the toy and occluder as two separate objects.  
 One could argue that these results suggest that young infants are able to reason about 
causal sequences, but only when they are dealing with a single object. However, if the ability 
to solve means-end search tasks involving two objects is dependent on reaching yet another 
cognitive stage in development, then young infants should not have benefited from viewing the 
demonstrations in Experiment 3. Both conditions provided opportunity for 6.5-month-old 
infants to alter their behavior through simple imitation, and were differentiated only as to 
whether the demonstrated actions provided a causal link to retrieval of the toy. The fact that the 
infants in the means-end demonstration produced more trails that were categorized as means-
end suggest that such a demonstration of the causal link between the occluder and the toy 
provided the infants with the experience with the task they needed in order to solve the search 
task. Such a finding is similar to the toy-attached condition of Experiment 2, which allowed 
infants’ access to crucial experience when the task was transformed to one that infants of that 
age have had previous experience solving.  
The compelling finding of the means-end demonstration condition of Experiment 3 was 
the fact that such a small amount of experience (i.e., exposure to a demonstration) with the 
solution resulted in successful search in a greater number of 6.5-month-old-infants. Future 
research is needed to explore the extent to which infants at this age are able to apply this 
existing knowledge, perhaps through the imposition of a time delay between the point when 
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infants view the demonstration of the solution and when they are given the opportunity to solve 
the task. Thus, while the present results cannot speak to young infants’ ability to apply their 
experience over delays or to generalize their knowledge to other occluders and toys, it is clear 
that young infants are able to perform causal reasoning when they are provided with situations 
that they have had previous experience with, or are provided experience through 
demonstrations of potential solutions. 
 As discussed above, the results of the experiments here are problematic for accounts of 
young infants’ failures at traditional means-end search tasks that are based on biological 
immaturity or cognitive development of casual sequence reasoning. But what do they mean for 
Munakata and her colleague’s (1997) theory that infants’ ability to successfully search for a 
hidden object is related to the strength of the representation the infants holds for the object 
when it is no longer visible? This theory holds that young infants fail at manual search tasks 
because the representation of a hidden object becomes graded as soon as the object is no longer 
in view, and continually loses its intensity over time. Moreover, the rate of representational 
loss is thought impact the nature of the events that follow the object’s disappearance from 
view. For example, young infants’ success at searching for toys hidden by darkness (Clifton, 
Perris, & Bullinger, 1991) is thought to result from the fact that the fragile representations of 
hidden objects held by infants between 5 and 7 months of age can withstand the darkness of a 
room, but not the direct interference from an occluder in traditional search tasks (Munakata et 
al., 1997; Shinskey & Munakata, 2003).  
The results of the toy-attached condition in Experiment 2 are consistent with Munakata 
and colleague’s (1997) graded representation view to the extent that the representation of the 
toy may have been strengthened by the demonstration that it and the occluder acted as a single 
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object. Accordingly, the occluder in such a situation might not be in direct competition with 
the representation of the toy, so the infant maybe able to better represent the composite object 
and track the interesting portion of it (i.e., the toy). While the interference of a graded 
representation of the toy may have been reduced in Experiment 2 by attaching the toy to the 
occluder, the same cannot be said for Experiment 3, where the toy and occluder remained 
unattached as two separate objects.  
Infants’ means-end search success in the means-end demonstration of Experiment 3, 
accompanied by failure in the non-means-end demonstration, is more difficult to explain from 
a graded representation perspective. If the original representation depends on the amount of 
exposure to the toy, then the strength of the representation should have been similar in the 
means-end and non-means-end demonstration conditions, because of infants’ equal exposure to 
the toy in each condition. Similarly, the amount of interference provided by the occluder was 
also the same in the means-end and non-means-end demonstration conditions of Experiment 3, 
as was the outcome for Experiment 3 (i.e., successful retrieval of the toy). In fact, the only 
difference between the two conditions was that the experience associated with the means-end 
condition included a direct causal link between the demonstrated action of pulling the occluder 
and retrieval of the toy. Accordingly, the only obvious way in which the strength of the 
representation of the toy could have differed between the means-end and non-means-end 
demonstration conditions was through internal activation via knowledge about the causal link 
provided by viewing the means-end demonstration. Ultimately, while graded representation 
theories may allow for influences to accumulate over time, they rest on the basic assumption 
that search failures reflect the operation of an underdeveloped system, one that, again, should 
not show such large changes following only a few demonstration trials. In contrast, an 
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explanation based on experiential limitations suggests that failures are not due to lack of 
development, but rather to lack of experience.  
 One assumption of the experiential limitation hypothesis is that infants younger than 8 
months possess the basic knowledge necessary to solve a manual search task, including the 
understanding that objects continue to exist when they are no longer visible. Indeed, the studies 
based on this assumption (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999; Baillargeon, 1987; 1993; 
Baillargeon, & Graber, 1987) have come under criticism in recent years (e.g., Bogartz, 
Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997; Cashon & Cohen, 2000; Haith, 1988).  Critics suggest that the 
findings from such visual based experiments are not indicative of high-level cognitive 
understanding or reasoning by infants, but rather indicative only of perceptual processing. For 
example, it has been suggested that researchers using visual based experiments to measure 
infants’ ability to represent hidden objects are, perhaps, simply detecting infants’ preferential 
response to novelty (e.g., Bogartz, Shinskey, & Speaker, 1997), or that infants are developing 
an expectation of what would happen to the objects while the objects are visible (Haith, 1998).  
Although young infants’ understanding of the existence of hidden objects was not 
explicitly tested, there is some evidence to support the idea that young infants hold some 
understanding that objects continue to exist when no longer visible. This was evident in the 
findings that 6.5-month-old-infants in the toy-attached and means-end demonstration 
conditions produced behaviours suggestive of their anticipation that the toy would appear at a 
specific location when they pulled the occluder down or around. These infants did not produce 
many behaviors that one might expect to be indicative of a lack of expectation and object 
permanence, such as making leisurely movements toward the toy when it became visible or not 
noticing the toy at all when it became visible. Instead, these 6.5-month-old infants produced 
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actions consistent with abilities reflecting object permanence and indicating anticipation (i.e., 
short latency times of looking to the toy) that echoed that of the older 8.5-month-old-infants.  
 One could argue that above results could be explained within the framework of 
dynamic systems theory. Dynamic systems theorists, such as Esther Thelen and her colleagues, 
suggest that behavior is merely the emergent property of the interaction between all forms of 
input, including those immediately present and from one’s recent past (e.g., Spencer & 
Schöner, 2003; Thelen & Smith, 1994). To this end, incorporating experience as a concept 
integral in understanding young infants’ performance on manual search tasks works well 
within a dynamic systems framework. A key element of modelling behavior within the 
framework of dynamic system theories, however, is the specification and determination of the 
weight of the various input sources. However, the elements considered crucial in young 
infants’ success in means-end search tasks are still highly underspecified, and thus, it is 
difficult to estimate the appropriate weights to assign to these elements with any precision. 
Indeed, few areas of psychological research are sufficiently well specified to properly apply a 
dynamical systems approach (Eliasmith, 1997). 
 The proposed experiential limitation hypothesis therefore provides a highly 
parsimonious and comprehensive explanation of the discrepancy between young infants’ 
performance on visual and manual search tasks than other leading explanations that have been 
proposed previously. These explanations are unable to fully account for the findings of the 
three experiments reported here. The experiential limitation hypothesis suggests that infants as 
young as 6 months of age are more sophisticated in their general abilities than many 
contemporary developmental psychologists would acknowledge (e.g., Bogart, Shinskey, & 
Speaker, 1997; Haith, 1998; Willatts, 1997). The above empirical support provided for the 
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experiential limitation hypothesis demonstrates that young infants not only understand how to 
solve means-end search tasks but also are able to use that knowledge to solve the task. 
 Increased experience with the physical world provides a means for advancement in 
infants’ cognitive abilities, practically through the onset of independent mobility (Bai & 
Bertenthal, 1992; Campos et al., 2000). The onset of crawling signifies the commencement of 
major changes in the psychology of the infant (e.g., referential gestural communication, and 
improved spatial search performance; Campos et al., 2000).  Bai and Bertenthal (1992), for 
example, examined the search behavior of same age infants of varying crawling abilities (i.e., 
pre-crawling, creeping, and crawling). Consistent with the experiential hypothesis, they found 
that increases in locomotor status were related to successful search performance. This finding 
suggests that as infants become more independent through increases in their mobility, they are 
increasingly able to explore and experience the world in a way that is conducive to specific 
application of existing knowledge structures. By the age of 8 months, infants are not only 
crawling, but also are successful in freely retrieving hidden objects in manual search tasks, a 
co-occurrence that should not go unmentioned.  
In summary, the research presented here addresses an important and previously 
unresolved issue in the study of infant cognition regarding the fact that infants younger than 8 
months of age typically fail to search for objects when hidden by an occluder. The result of this 
research suggests that the ability to search for occluded objects, which has traditionally been 
taken as a hallmark of object permanence, may not be caused by deficiencies in young infants’ 
representations, but may instead be due to limitations in their experiences with the physical 
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